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Unlawful Securities Transactions And Scienter: An
Emasculating Requirement
Recognizing that most people are unfamiliar with the com-
plexities of corporate organization and the intricacies of invest-
ing, the legislatures of all fifty states designed laws to protect
investors from the dishonest schemes of unscrupulous securities
promoters.' Because of the diverse approaches the states took to
regulate the offer, sale, or purchase of securities, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the
Uniform Securities Act' to achieve a substantial degree of uni-
formity3 among those states assimilating its provisions. Although
uniformity was a paramount objective,' the Uniform Act's draf-
ters, realizing the impracticality of complete uniformity among
the states,5 provided options to permit expression of each state's
individual regulatory policy.' In 1959, the Washington Legisla-
ture adopted a modified version7 of the Uniform Securities Act.'
A Vashington appellate court, however, recently diminis edu t h
Washington Act's protective scope.?
This comment suggests the proper construction of the unlaw-
ful transactions provision ° of the Washington Act and rejects
1. State regulation of securities transactions in the United States began in 1911 when
the Kansas Legislature passed the first securities law. L. Loss & E. Cow-rr, BLUE SKY
LAW 5 (1958). These statutes are generally referred to as "Blue Sky Laws" because their
purpose is to prevent "speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet
of 'blue sky.'" Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917).
2. Uniform Securities Act. [Hereinafter referred to as Uniform Act].
3. L. Loss & E. Cowmrr, supra note 1, at 236.
4. Id. at 230.
5. Id. at 236.
6. The Uniform Act contains four parts. The first three parts, which the drafters
designed to enable states to adopt individually or in any combination, represent the basic
"blue sky" philosophies: (I) the "fraud" approach, (11) registration of broker-dealers,
agents, and investment advisors, and (III) registration of securities. Part IV contains
general provisions, such as definitions and exemptions, essential in varying degrees under
any of the three basic philosophies. L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECuITIs ACr
5 (1976).
7. The most significant modification is the Washington Legislature's failure to adopt
§ 410(h) of the Uniform Act, which the drafters designed to prevent state courts from
implying a private cause of action, as happened under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970). See L. Loss, supra note 6, at 151; notes 21 &
22 infra, and accompanying text. In 1977, the Legislature amended the civil liabilities
provision, WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430 (Supp. 1977), to include private liability for viola-
tions of the unlawful transactions provision, WASH. Rv. CODE § 21.20.010 (1976).
8. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 21.20.005-.940 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
9. See Ludwig v. Mutual Real Estate Investors, 18 Wash. App. 33, 567 P.2d 658
(1977).
10. WASH. REv. CODE § 21.20.010 (1976). The text of the statute is set out in the text
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scienter as a necessary element of a violation of that provision.
The discussion necessitates consideration of federal rule 10b-5,"
because the rule is the source of the Uniform Act's unlawful trans-
actions provision. The focus, however, is on the inapplicability of
the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder" to the Washington Act's construction.
Massive fraud in securities transactions, culminating in the
stock market crash of 1929, demonstrated the need for compre-
hensive securities regulation.' 3 Congress designed the Securities
Act of 1933"1 to insure an investor's access to pertinent facts con-
cerning securities offered for sale and to protect against fraud and
misrepresentation in securities transactions.' 5 The Securities
Exchange Act of 193416 increased investors' protection, substitut-
ing "a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor. . . to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the
securities industry."' 7 Because Congress devised the Acts to pro-
tect the public from speculative or fraudulent schemes, and be-
cause they are remedial statutes, congressional intent requires
that they be given a liberal construction. Section 10(b)'" of the
1934 Act makes it unlawful for any person, while purchasing or
selling any security, to use or employ a manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission's rules and regulations.
accompanying note 66 infra.
11. Rule 10b-5 states:
Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interestate [sic] commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or,
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). See notes 20-24 infra and accompanying text.
12. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
13. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong. 1st Sess. 4 (1933). See Douglas & Bates, The Federal
Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933); James, The Securities Act of 1933, 32
MICH. L. REV. 624, 624-30 (1934).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
15. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970).
17. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
18. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ent.,
Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1973).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
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Acting pursuant to section 10(b), the Commission promul-
gated rule 10b-5,20 which it intended for use in injunctive proceed-
ings rather than in private damage actions.21 Notwithstanding the
Commission's intent, courts have recognized private damage ac-
tions under rule 10b-5.22 Because neither the statute nor the rule
indicates the elements in a private suit, courts have had difficulty
defining rule 10b-5's scope. The elements most commonly consid-
ered essential in private 10b-5 actions are: misrepresentation or
omission, materiality, scienter, reliance, and causation.2 3 The ele-
ment of scienter, in particular, has presented problems for the
courts because of varying, often imprecise and contradictory uses
of the word.
In misrepresentation actions, common law traditionally de-
fines scienter as the intent to deceive, mislead, or convey a false
impression.2 4 Although some courts have employed the intent to
deceive definition of scienter in 10b-5 cases, 25 most federal courts
have defined scienter to include other states of mind, such as
reckless..ness, 2  actual knowlerg of fa1ity,2 17 negligence2 5 or lack
of due diligence.29 In one opinion the United States Supreme
Court defined scienter as intent" or knowledge,3' but also sug-
20. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
21. Remark by Milton V. Freeman, former Assistant Solicitor of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, at American Bar Association Conference on Codification of the
Federal Securities Laws, published in Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities
Laws, 22 Bus. LAW 793, 922 (1967).
22. For an annotation of the decisions discussing whether 10b-5 provides a private
cause of action, see 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW § 2.2 (451) at 22.9 (1977). See also
Note, Rule lOb-5 Damages: The Runaway Development of a Common Law Remedy, 28
U. FLA. L. REv. 76 (1975). Although § 10(b) of the 1934 Act does not expressly provide a
private civil remedy, beginning with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1946), lower federal courts have repeatedly held civil liability is implied for
violations of rule 10b-5. The Supreme Court recognized an implied cause of action in
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
23. 3 A. BROMBERG, SECuRmES LAW § 8.1 at 195 (1977). The first case to require
scienter in a 10b-5 action was Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
24. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 700 (4th Ed. 1971).
25. See, e.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786 (2d Cir. 1951).
26. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir. 1968).
27. SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 461 (2d Cir. 1968).
28. See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
29. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 102 (10th Cir. 1971).
30. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (scienter as used by the
Court comports with "the commonly understood meaning of intentional wrongdoing").
31. Id. at 197 (the language of § 10(b) "strongly suggests that § 10(b) was intended
to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct"). For two post-Ernst & Ernst cases hold-
ing knowledge to be sufficient, see Raskas v. Supreme Equip. & Sys. Corp., 71 F.R.D. 672
(E.D.N.Y. 1976) (referring to knowledge as necessary under the most strict view of the
scienter requirement); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1082 (D. Del. 1976)
("knowing misconduct").
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gested recklessness may supply the scienter element.32 Scienter
creates further confusion because a court may require varying
degrees of scienter depending upon the factual setting and the
relief sought.3
Prior to 1976, the United States Courts of Appeals had split
on the issue of whether scienter was an essential element of a 10b-
5 violation.34 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals consistently
rejected the necessity of proving scienter"5 and, in White v.
Abrams,"' suggested the proper consideration is the extent of the
duty to disclose that rule 10b-5 imposes on a particular defen-
dant.37 White instructed district courts to measure the extent of
defendant's duty by a flexible standard. This standard required
courts to focus on the goals of securities fraud legislation, by
considering factors previously found significant in securities
transactions8 and all factors relevant to the particular case.
32. 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 ("In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to
be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. We need
not address the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient
for liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."). At least two post-Ernst & Ernst lower court
decisions have read that case to permit including recklessness under rule 10b-5. Bailey v.
Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982, 993 (7th Cir. 1976); Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 415 F.
Supp. 95, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
33. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969) (Judge Friendly, in his concurring opinion, states that although
negligent misstatement by a corporation may be enough for injunctive relief under rule
10b-5, the decision is not precedent for corporate liability for damages in a private ac-
tion.); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967) (held that
a claim was stated under rule 10b-5 for injunctive relief but that the trial court properly
dismissed the claim for damages); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180, 193 (1963). ('[I]t is not necessary in a suit for equitable or prophylactic relief to
establish all the elements required in a suit for monetary damages.").
34. By early 1976 eight United States Courts of Appeal had ruled directly on the
scienter issue. Three required scienter: Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579,
606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277,
1306 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc). Two suggested they might require scienter: Carras v.
Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 407-08
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976). Two ruled negligence sufficient: Hoch-
felder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1104 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 185 (1976);
Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1239 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970);
Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963) (dictum). One court attempted to
abolish the scienter requirement, White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 734 (9th Cir. 1974);
Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter, 291
F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961).
35. See Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962)
("common law fraud need not be alleged or ultimately proved"); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d
270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961) (proof of genuine fraud unnecessary).
36. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
37. Id. at 734-35.
38. Without limiting the trial court to the specific factors enumerated, White sug-
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The United States Supreme Court addressed the scienter
issue in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,39 and concluded that absent
some form of scienter, a private cause of action for damages will
not lie under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.11 Justice Powell, writ-
ing for the majority,4' emphasized section 10(b)'s language, which
makes unlawful the use or employment of "any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance" in contravention of SEC rules.
He suggested the words "manipulative" or "deceptive" used in
conjunction with "device" or "contrivance" indicate section
10(b) was directed at knowing or intentional misconduct and
make unmistakable a congressional intent to proscribe a type of
conduct different from negligence.4 2 Justice Powell found the
word "manipulative" particularly significant, suggesting it is vir-
tually a term of art that, when used in connection with securities
markets,4 3 connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to
deceive or defraud investors.4
Although asserting the statute's plain meaning might make
further inquiry unnecessary, Justice Powell re w d .iona. s
port from the Act's legislative history." Legislative reports indi-
gested the following: (1) the relationship of defendant to plaintiff; (2) defendant's access
to the information as compared to plaintiff's access; (3) the benefit defendant derives from
the relationship; (4) defendant's awareness of whether plaintiff was relying upon their
relationship in making his investment decisions; (5) defendant's activity in initiating the
securities transaction in question. Id. at 735-36.
39. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
40. Id. at 193. The opinion fails, however, to define the state of mind necessary for a
10b-5 violation. Justice Powell initially defines scienter as "a mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." Id. at 193-94 n.12. The Court specifically
declines to decide whether "reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b)
and rule 10b-5." Id. The Court also fails to state explicitly whether scienter is present
when defendant has knowledge, but where there is no proof of intent to deceive. Subse-
quent to Ernst & Ernst, most lower federal courts have found defendants liable under §
10(b) without requiring plaintiff to prove specific intent to defraud. See, e.g., Neill v.
David A. Noyes & Co., 416 F. Supp. 78, 82 (N.D. ll. 1976) ("some forms of scienter beyond
mere negligence"). For a discussion of the future impact of Ernst & Ernst, see Berner &
Franklin, Scienter and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 1Ob-5 Injunctive Ac-
tions: A Reappraisal in Light of Hochfelder, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 769 (1976); Bucklo, The
Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule lOb-5; Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1977); Cox, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: A Critique
and an Evaluation of Its Impact upon the Scheme of the Federal Securities Laws, 28
HASTINGs L.J. 569 (1977). See note 32 supra.
41. Justice Powell wrote for a majority of six Justices. Justices Brennan and
Blackmun dissented. Justice Stevens did not participate.
42. 425 U.S. at 199.
43. Id.
44. See Loss, Summary Remarks, 30 Bus. LAW 163, 165 (1975). Professor Loss argues
that although the language of rule lob-5 may not call for scienter, without a scienter
requirement 10b-5 may exceed the bounds of its authorizing statute.
45. 425 U.S. at 201.
46. Id. at 201-06.
1978] Securities Transactions
cated Congress intended good faith to be a defense under those
sections of the 1934 Act creating express civil liability for manipu-
lative practices.47 Accordingly, he concluded that good faith is a
defense in suits brought under section 10(b)'s implied right of
action. 8
Justice Powell argues most persuasively for scienter as a nec-
essary 10b-5 element when he discusses the 1933 and 1934 Acts
as interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme gov-
erning securities transactions. 4 In many of the provisions ex-
pressly creating civil liability in securities transactions, Congress
clearly specified whether knowing or intentional conduct, negli-
gence, or innocent mistake is culpable conduct. 0 Congress also
created procedural restrictions limiting purchasers' and sellers'
ability to sue under these provisions.5' Rule 10b-5 has no compa-
rable restrictions; therefore, if courts do not require some form of
scienter, causes of action arising under the express liability provi-
sions could be brought instead under the judicially created pri-
vate damage remedy of rule 10b-5. This practice would nullify
other provisions' procedural limitations, thereby disrupting the
federal regulatory scheme and circumventing congressional in-
tent.
Because of the similarity in language between Washington's
unlawful transactions provision 2 and rule 10b-5, Washington
47. Id. at 206.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 206-11. The Court stated:
We also consider it significant that each of the express civil remedies in the
1933 Act allowing recovery for negligent conduct, see §§ 11, 12(2), 15, . . . is
subject to significant procedural restrictions not applicable under § 10(b) ....
We think these procedural limitations indicate that the judicially created pri-
vate damage remedy under § 10(b) - which has no comparable restrictions -
cannot be extended, consistently with the intent of Congress, to actions prem-
ised on negligent wrongdoing. Such extension would allow causes of action cov-
ered by § 11, § 12(2), and § 15 to be brought under § 10(b) and thereby nullify
the effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural restrictions on these express
actions.
Id. at 208-10 (footnotes omitted).
50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77o, 78i, 78r, 78t (1970).
51. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i (creating civil liability for any person who "willfully
participates" in the manipulation of securities on a national exchange), 78r (creating civil
liability for misleading statements filed with the Commission, but providing defendant
with the defense that "he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement
was false and misleading"), 78t (imposing liability upon "controlling person[s]" for
violations of the Act by those they control, but providing defendant with the defense that
he "acted in good faith and did not ... induce the act. . . constituting the violation")
(1970).
52. WASH. REv. CODE § 21.20.010 (1976).
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courts have looked to federal precedent when construing the
Washington statute. In Shermer v. Baker,5" the Washington
Court of Appeals first considered whether scienter is necessary for
a violation of the unlawful transactions provision. The court re-
lied upon Ninth Circuit decisions holding proof of common law
fraud, particularly the element of scienter, unnecessary to estab-
lish a 10b-5 cause of action.54 Although noting the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of a similarly worded federal statute was not deter-
minative of state law, the Washington court held plaintiffs reli-
ance upon a material misrepresentation or omission established
a cause of action under the unlawful transactions provision and
proof of defendant's intent to deceive is not required."
The same appellate court recently reconsidered the "no
scienter" interpretation of the unlawful transactions provision in
Ludwig v. Mutual Real Estate Investors." Ludwig impliedly over-
ruled the court's previous interpretation and offered two grounds
for limiting "fraud," as used in Washington's Securities Act, to
its common law meaning. 7 First, when the Legislature uses a
term without defining it and the term has a well known common
law meaning, a presumption arises that the Legislature intended
the common law meaning. 8 Second, the United States Supreme
Court in Ernst & Ernst overruled the Ninth Circuit line of cases
upon which the Washington court relied for its "no scienter"
holding."
At common law, a plaintiff may recover damages incurred in
the purchase or sale of securities under theories of (1) fraud and
deceit, (2) constructive fraud or negligent misrepresentation, (3)
liability based upon half-truth, and (4) liability based upon
breach of fiduciary duty. 0 The first theory, fraud and deceit,
requires scienter. In nonsecurities cases, however, Washington
courts have firmly established their acceptance of the second
theory, constructive fraud, which requires proof of negligence, but
53. 2 Wash. App. 845, 472 P.2d 589 (1970).
54. Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis v.
Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961).
55. 2 Wash. App. at 857-58, 472 P.2d at 597.
56. 18 Wash. App. 33, 567 P.2d 658 (1977).
57. Id. at 40, 567 P.2d at 661.
58. Id. The court suggests the Legislature's refusal to adopt § 401(d) of the Uniform
Act, which declares "fraud" is not limited to its common law meaning, strengthens the
presumption.
59. Id. at 40, 567 P.2d at 662.
60. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?,




The Washington Supreme Court first indicated acceptance
of the equitable or constructive fraud theory in Hanson v.
Tompkins."2 Relying on Hanson, Grant v. Huschke 3 held a ven-
dor liable for false representations inducing a sale of real prop-
erty, although he made them without knowledge of their falsity
or intent to deceive, where the vendor knew the vendee was igno-
rant of the facts and relied upon the misrepresentations. By anal-
ogy, the rationale supporting application of the constructive
fraud doctrine to real property transactions is more compelling in
securities transactions because purchasers or sellers of securities
are less able to protect themselves against misrepresentations. A
real estate vendee can inspect the land to determine whether it
conforms to the vendor's representations. Investors in securities,
however, cannot realistically inspect a corporation's books, as-
sets, or business practices, but must rely upon the representations
of others. Investors, therefore, need more protection against fac-
tual misrepresentations. Because negligence, not common law
fraud, is the basis of an action for constructive fraud," defen-
dant's duty is to exercise reasonable care in disclosing material
facts relevant to a securities transaction. 5
The unlawful transactions provision of Washington's Securi-
ties Act makes no specific reference to a scienter requirement.
The statute provides:
61. See J & J Food Centers, Inc. v. Selig, 76 Wash. 2d 304, 456 P.2d 691 (1969); Brown
v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 53 Wash. 2d 142, 332 P.2d 228 (1958); Holland Furnace Co. v.
Korth, 43 Wash. 2d 618, 262 P.2d 772 (1953); Hanson v. Tompkins, 2 Wash. 508, 27 P. 73
(1891).
62. 2 Wash. 508, 27 P. 73 (1891). Hanson was an action upon a promissory note given
in part payment for real estate. Because plaintiff misrepresented the acreage, the court
limited his recovery to the value of the tract as represENTED, STATING:
If he knew the lot did not contain 36 1/2 acres, and represented to defendants
that it did, he would be guilty of fraud and deceit; but if he did not know it,
and believed that the representations he made were true, and defendants, acting
upon such representations, were damaged because it eventuated that they were
not true, the liability of the plaintiff would be the same. In neither case will he
be allowed to retain the benefit flowing from his misrepresentation.
Id. at 511, 27 P. at 74.
63. 74 Wash. 257, 133 P. 447 (1913). "[Wlhere the representations are as to pure
matters of fact and made under circumstances entitling the adverse party to rely upon
them as true, then the fact that they are false raises a legal presumption of fraudulent
intent." Id. at 263, 133 P. at 449.
64. J & J Food Centers, Inc. v. Selig, 76 Wash. 2d 304, 311, 456 P.2d 691, 695 (1969);
Brown v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 53 Wash. 2d 142, 150, 332 P.2d 228, 233 (1958).
65. W. PROSSER, supra note 24, § 107, at 706. See Goodhart, Liability for Innocent
but Negligent Misrepresentation, 74 YALE L.J. 286 (1964).
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It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer,
sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly:
(1) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud;
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which
they are made, not misleading; or
(3) To engage in any act, practice or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person.6
If courts impose a scienter element, its source, therefore, is judi-
cial statutory construction.
Although courts can construe the words "to defraud" in
clause (1) and "operate as a fraud" in clause (3) to mean common
law fraud and, therefore, to require scienter, clause (2) has no
such purport. The issue is whether these three clauses are mu-
tually exclusive or should be read together. Clause (2) consists of
two parts: the first speaks to material misstatements, or misfeas-
ance, and the second to material omissions, or nonfeasance. A
material misstatement can be considered a clause (1) "device" as
well as a clause (3) "act." Similarly, a material omission can be
considered a clause (1) "scheme" as well as a clause (3)
"practice." Therefore, to imply a scienter requirement in clause
(2) renders the clause superfluous. Although one can make the
converse argument that dispensing with a scienter requirement in
clause (2) renders clauses (1) and (3) superfluous, this analysis is
faulty. Drafted in much broader terms than clause (2), clauses (1)
and (3) apply to any fraudulent "device," "scheme," "artifice,"
"act," "practice," or "course of business." Clause (3)'s language
is particularly expansive, appearing to make conduct unlawful
whether or not it defrauds, because it is sufficient if the conduct
"would operate" as a fraud or deceit. Clause (3)'s "course of
business" suggests culpability arises from the cumulative effects
of acts, none of which individually operates as a fraud or deceit.
Clause (2), however, is narrowly drafted and applies to
"statements" only. Simply because courts can construe the lan-
guage of clauses (1) and (3) to require intent to deceive, does not
mean the language of clause (2) imposes a scienter requirement.
Although the United States Supreme Court held some form
of scienter an element of the similarly worded rule 10b-5, the
factors underlying the Court's decision 7 have tenuous signifi-
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.010 (1976).
67. See text accompanying notes 39-51 supra.
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cance in construing Washington's unlawful transactions provi-
sion. Rule 10b-5 makes no explicit reference to a scienter require-
ment. Section 10(b) is also devoid of any specific language requir-
ing scienter, but authorizes rules and regulations proscribing
"any manipulative or deceptive device." Rule 10b-5, like any
other administrative regulation, must be within the ambit of its
enabling statute to be valid. 8 Therefore, if one accepts Justice
Powell's analysis that "manipulative" connotes intentional and
wilful conduct, section 10(b) limits the Securities and Exchange
Commission's authority to promulgating rules requiring scienter.
Rule 10b-5's language, unencumbered by the language of its ena-
bling statute, does not require scienter. Although the language of
Washington's unlawful transactions provision is substantially
rule 10b-5's, the statute omits the "manipulative or deceptive"
language of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act-the language the Court
found so convincing in Ernst & Ernst. Ludwig failed to recognize
that, by enacting the unlawful transactions provision, the Wash-
ington Legislature elevated the language of rule 10b-5 to indepen-
dent statutory significance and, therefore, the statute does not
require scienter.
Ernst & Ernst's legislative history analysis is unpersuasive
when applied to Washington's unlawful transactions provision
because congressional legislative history is irrelevant to state
statutory construction and because Washington's Securities Act
contains its own legislative intent section.8 Although the Wash-
ington statute commands courts to construe Chapter 21.20 to
coordinate its interpretation and administration with the related
federal law, Shermer v. Baker unequivocally states that coordina-
tion does not require imitation.70 The section merely requires the
courts to construe and enforce the Washington Act in a manner
not interfering with the federal scheme.7 So long as they meet
this requirement, Washington courts may construe the state stat-
ute in a manner best promoting its purpose of protecting investors
from fraudulent practices and dishonest schemes.
68. Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir. 1960).
69. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.900 (1976) states: "STATUTORY POLICY 21.20.900
Construction to secure uniformity. This chapter shall be so construed as to effectuate its
general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it and to coordinate
the interpretation and administration of this chapter with the related federal regulation."
70. 2 Wash. App. 845, 857, 472 P.2d 589, 596 (1970).
71. A plaintiff can choose either a federal or state forum only if he can meet the
federal jurisdictional requirements. Eliminating the scienter element under Washington's
unlawful transactions provision, and thus reducing plaintiff's burden of proof, will benefi-
cially affect the federal scheme by reducing the number of claims brought in the federal
forum.
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A "no scienter" construction of the unlawful transactions
provision will not undermine the anti-fraud provisions of the
Washington Act. Although the structure of the federal securities
scheme buttresses Justice Powell's position that construing rule
10b-5 in harmony with other federal securities provisions compels
a scienter requirement for 10b-5 actions, 72 his analysis is inapplic-
able when courts construe Washington's Securities Act. Three
statutes comprise the "Fraudulent and Other Prohibited Prac-
tices" section of the Act, but only the unlawful transactions pro-
vision deals with offers, sales, or purchases. 73 Analysis of the rela-
tionship between the unlawful transactions provision and the
criminal liabilities provision" adds further support to the "no
scienter" construction. The latter provides criminal sanctions for
any willful violation of the unlawful transactions provision. The
Washington Supreme Court defines willful as recklessly making
untrue statements, without knowledge of the facts, and with in-
tent to deceive. 75 Based upon the statutory tort theory," under
which violation of a criminal statute may result in civil liability,
any violation of the criminal liabilities provision may imply7 a
private action for damages after determination of criminal liabil-
ity. Therefore, to read an intent to deceive requirement into the
unlawful transactions provision renders the provision super-
flUOUS. 78
72. See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
73. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 21.20.020, .030 (1976) prohibit certain investment advisor
practices. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430 (Supp. 1977), the civil liabilities section of the Act,
creates a private cause of action only for direct or indirect violations of WASH. REV. CODE
§ 21.20.010 (1976) or for violations of WASH. REv. CODE §§ 21.20.140-.230 (1976). The latter
provisions deal solely with registration requirements.
74. CRIMINAL LIABILITIES
21.20.400 Penalty for violation of chapter-Limitations of actions.
Any person who wilfully violates any provision of this chapter except RCW
21.20.350, or who wilfully violates RCW 21.20.350 knowing the statement made
to be false or misleading in any material respect, shall upon conviction be fined
not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both; but no person may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order if
he proves that he had no knowledge of the rule or order. No indictment or
information may be returned under this chapter more than five years after the
alleged violation.
WASH. REv. CODE § 21.20.400 (1976).
75. State v. Hynds, 84 Wash. 2d 657, 664, 529 P.2d 829, 834 (1974).
76. See generally Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes,
77 H~Av. L. REV. 285 (1973).
77. The meaning of the term "implied remedy" is set out in this language of the
Supreme Court: "[D]isregard of the command of the statute [which does not specifically
create a civil remedy] is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from
the party in default is implied .... Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
78. Washington is committed to the rule that the violation of a positive statute or
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Washington's Securities Act expresses in its legislative intent
section 9 a statutory policy that courts construe the Act's provi-
sions to make uniform the law of those states adopting the Uni-
form Act. This clearly stated policy required the Ludwig court to
consider decisions reached in other Uniform Securities Act juris-
dictions. The unlawful transactions provision ° of the Securities
Act of New Mexico' is almost identical to Washington's. In
Treider v. Doherty & Co., 81 the only other decision construing an
unlawful transactions provision, the New Mexico Court of Ap-
peals discussed the elements of a violation of that statute. The
court construed the statute to require only a material false state-
ment or an omission of a material fact necessary to make the
statement true. The court stated defendant's intent is irrelevant
under the statute's terms.84 Although Washington's legislative
intent section did not require Ludwig to accept the New Mexico
Court of Appeals' analysis, the section did require the court to
consider the Treider precedent when construing the unlawful
transactions provision.
In construing Washington's unlawful transactions provision,
courts must realize the common law doctrines of fraud and deceit
emerged from a business climate very different from that in-
volved in the sale of securities.85 Unlike purchasers of tangible
assets, securities investors generally cannot rely upon their own
investigation. Furthermore, expert advice is unavailing where
only an "insider" has access to critical information. Scienter en-
compasses a moral element that is inappropriate in deciding the
ordinance constitutes negligence per se. See Daley v. Stephens, 64 Wash. 2d 806, 394 P.2d
801 (1964); Ward v. Zeugner, 64 Wash. 2d 570, 392 P.2d 811 (1964); Wood v. Chicago M.,
St.P. & P.R.R., 45 Wash. 2d 601, 277 P.2d 345 (1954); Portland-Seattle Auto Freight, Inc.
v. Jones, 15 Wash. 2d 603, 131 P.2d 736 (1942).
79. See note 69 supra.
80. Fraudulent practices-A. It is a fraudulent practice and unlawful for any
person, in connection with an offer, sale or purchase of any security, directly or
indirectly, to:
(1) employ any device, scheme or artifice to defaud;
(2) make any false statement of material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made true
in light of circumstances under which they are made; or
(3) engage in any act, practice or course of business which oper-
ates, or would operate, as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-29 A(1966).
81. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-18-16 to 35 (1966).
82. 86 N.M. 735, 527 P.2d 498 (1975).
83. Id. at 737, 537 P.2d at 500.
84. Id.
85. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1962).
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question of civil liability for a securities law violation. The statu-
tory remedy for violation of the unlawful transactions provision
is rescission .8 As in contract analysis, the right of the aggrieved
party to be made whole should depend upon whether the oppos-
ing party actually performed his promise, not upon whether he
intended to perform.
Although strict liability, as in contract analysis, would pro-
mote civil liability's compensatory objectives, Washington courts
should reject this standard, because it would pit innocent parties
against each other and result in compensation of undeserving
investors by innocent investors. 7 Additionally, strict liability
might have unsettling effects on the securities markets because
placing oppressive burdens on good faith sellers may restrict the
volume of securities transactions.8 Conversely, insuring investors
against ordinary investment losses upon proof of an inadvertent
and faultless misstatement or omission made prior to the transac-
tion encourages speculation.8 Furthermore, a strict liability stan-
dard may adversely affect the flow of information to the public.
Liability for inadvertent misstatements or omissions may inhibit
voluntary disclosures of information to the market and retard,
rather than promote, the goals of the unlawful transactions provi-
sion.
When construing the unlawful transactions provision, Wash-
ington courts should look to the statute's purpose of protecting
investors who rely on market information. Courts should apply a
standard that promotes equality of bargaining power between
purchasers and sellers of securities. A knowledge standard is su-
perior to a common law fraud standard for three reasons: (1) it is
more attuned to the information distribution aspects of securities
law; (2) it eliminates judicial reliance upon scienter, or other
catch phrases, and promotes sound factual analysis; and (3) it
places an equal burden on both parties to the transaction because
the knowledge of each determines potential liability. Washington
courts, therefore, should focus on what defendant knows or rea-
sonably should know about a particular transaction rather than
on his subjective intent.
86. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430 (Supp. 1977).
87. Courts should require both parties to reasonably investigate the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the transaction. An investor should not be liable unless a reasonable
investigation would have disclosed the misstated or omitted information.
88. Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule lob-5, 32 U. Cm. L. REv.
824, 835 (1965).
89. Id. at 834.
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Judicial inquiry must focus on the parties' relative knowl-
edge. Plaintiff may allege either a material misrepresentation or
omission, but must prove defendant's representations induced a
transaction detrimental to plaintiff. Defendant is not liable, how-
ever, if he was unaware of the falsity or omission, and may assert
as a defense plaintiff's actual or constructive knowledge of the
facts. Thus, if defendant was aware of the falsity or omission, but
plaintiff also knew the truth, defendant is not liable. This stan-
dard avoids the problems of intent and innocent mistake, yet
protects the investor by requiring judicial examination of the
parties' knowledge.
In applying a knowledge standard to alleged violations of the
unlawful transactions provision, courts must also consider con-
structive knowledge in determining liability. Actual knowledge is
the belief in the existence of a fact that coincides with the truth.1°
Constructive knowledge is what a reasonable person should know
rather than what he does know. Constructive knowledge also
means knowledge of facts stimulating inquiry or failure to per-
form a duty of acquiring information." The constructive knowl-
edge of both plaintiff and defendant is relevant, but the trier of
fact should focus on the reasonableness of each party's investiga-
tion into the facts. In analyzing the reasonableness of the parties'
investigations, the trier of fact must consider such factors as the
parties' relative access to information and defendant's activity in
initiating the transaction to determine whether constructive
knowledge can be attributed to either plaintiff or defendant.2
This approach recognizes that one investor may have less ability
than another to give the other contracting party an accurate pic-
ture of a particular transaction and apportions liability accord-
ingly. The investor who, in connection with the offer, sale, or
purchase of a security, makes a material misstatement or omis-
sion should not be liable unless a reasonable investigation under
the circumstances would have uncovered the misstated or omit-
ted information. The emphasis is on access to knowledge, and the
knowledge standard effectuates the unlawful transactions provi-
sion's policy of protecting gullible, unsophisticated investors,
without the potential adverse effects of alternative standards of
liability.
Nothing in the language of Washington's Securities Act indi-
cates scienter is a necessary element of a violation of the unlawful
90. W. PRossER, supra note 24, § 32, at 150.
91. 1 M. MERRILL, MERmLL oN NoTICE § 18 (1952).
92. Note 38 supra.
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transactions provision. Courts should not read the legislative in-
tent section 3 of the Washington Act to require intent to deceive.
The unlawful transactions provision's relationship to other sub-
stantive provisions militates against a scienter requirement. 4 If
Washington courts require scienter, the unlawful transactions
provision is little improvement, if any, over the old common law,
long ago found incapable of adequately policing modern day se-
curities transactions." Ludwig v. Mutual Real Estate Investors
constitutes a complete abdication by a Washington court of any
role in policing securities transactions falling outside narrowly
defined categories of conduct" and, therefore, represents another
instance of state courts refusing to seize the opportunities pre-
sented to them and an unfortunate example of a failure of federal-
ism.
David Strout
93. See note 69 supra.
94. See notes 72-78 supra, and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Goodwin v. Aggazise, 283 Mass.
358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933).
96. E.g., WAsH. REv. CODE §§ 21.20.140 (sale of unregistered securities), .350 (false
and misleading statements in filed documents) (1976).
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